Showing posts with label Federalists. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federalists. Show all posts

Friday, March 16, 2007

Number 5: James Monroe

Years in office: 1817-1825
Pre-service occupations: soldier, diplomat, Confederation congressman, Virginia legislator and governor, U.S. senator, secretary of state (Madison), secretary of war (Madison)
Key events during his administration: acquisition of Florida (1819) and first Seminole war (1819); Missouri compromise (1820), Monroe Doctrine (1823); states admitted to the Union: Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), Missouri (1821); Panic of 1819

Presidential rating:
Mostly successful and popular

ESSAY

On Christmas Day, 1776, George Washington led his army across the ice-clogged Delaware River to attack a Hessian force encamped at Trenton, New Jersey. The battle was more complicated than legend says—the Hessians weren’t caught in a drunken stupor—but Gen. Washington’s men achieved surprise and carried the day.

Only two Americans were wounded, both seriously. One was young Lieutenant James Monroe, shot in the shoulder while rushing an artillery battery. A doctor clamped his severed artery, which prevented his bleeding to death.

Lt. Monroe would return to the army in late 1777 in time to freeze at the infamous winter camp at Valley Forge. He would later fight in Washington’s solid victory at Monmouth Courthouse in 1778, and would leave the army for good as a colonel. Bitterly disappointed that he couldn’t obtain a field command, Monroe turned to politics in 1780, a path that lead him to the White House 36 years later.

James Monroe was the last man to become president as a hero of the
Revolution—as an officer of the line, not as a political, theoretical or rhetorical hero. But no other man connected with the Revolution itself—politician or soldier—ever attained the White House again.

Remembering Monroe
Monroe is the only president to be remembered primarily for a policy bearing his
name—a policy that is still in effect. The Monroe Doctrine, in biographer Gary Hart’s odd words, makes him our “first national security president.” But it’s by no means all there was to Monroe, or all that defines his era. Monroe lead the nation in a time that was mislabeled the “Era of Good Feelings” where westward expansion truly commenced, commerce started anew after the war—and the nation’s first economic depression set in following that war—and the nation shook with the first of many major convulsions over slavery.

It was a time when America first got cocky. After all, we had just defeated the world’s mightiest power—at least, we fooled ourselves into thinking that—and seemed, for a little while, invincible. The era did seem full of good feelings. And James Monroe seemed like the right man for the job to carry forward Democrat-Republican principles from the east coast to the ever-expanding west.

Congressional nomination
By 1816, James Monroe was one of the most qualified men in the country to be considered the next chief executive, if not the most. Governor, state legislator, congressman of the Confederation, senator, secretary of state, secretary of war, diplomat and foreign minister: he was indeed an amazingly well-rounded man. But the experience that counted most in men’s eyes was that prize of presidential appointments: secretary of state.

He was also well-known, thanks to his foreign adventures: he helped negotiate with Napoleon for Louisiana, and waged war and peace with Madison in the late conflict with England. But all was not well in his party. New Yorkers in particular weren’t keen at the thought of yet another Virginian becoming president. Purist Republican members of Congress held a caucus in early 1816, in hopes of choosing another candidate, but in another caucus among all Republican members a few days later, Monroe was selected. This had the dual effect of Monroe being selected by Congress to be the next president, thus “owing” his ascendancy to them, and also ensuring that Monroe would be the next president. The Federalist standard bearer, Rufus King, never actively campaigned, and Monroe swept to an easy victory.

A strong cabinet and one-party unity
Unlike his predecessor’s choices for officers, Monroe’s cabinet choices were superb. At state, he named John Quincy Adams of New England, a Federalist convert to Republicanism and famed not so much for his father but for his established skills as a diplomat. For war, he had asked Henry Clay, but Clay declined in a puff, mad that he wasn’t given State. (Clay would become his nemesis in Congress.) The post would go to John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. At treasury, Monroe retained Madison’s last secretary, William H. Crawford.

Monroe’s wish was to have a strong representative from each section of the nation in his cabinet, in part to have a voice from those sections—smart—but also because he wanted to continue Jefferson’s mission of burying the Federalists. Monroe wanted to return to the earliest days of America where there were no parties, and it seemed like an obtainable goal with the Federalists marginalized to New England.

Good feelings
The so-called “Era of Good Feelings” actually began shortly after Monroe’s inauguration. The new president embarked on an unprecedented—and never repeated—good-will tour around the Union. At first, he wanted to remain inconspicuous, and just visit coastal defenses as a pretext to building them up (a major hallmark of his presidency), but Republican well-wishers and ordinary citizens turned out wherever he went. Even Federalist New England received him well—a Connecticut newspaper editorialized that “The demon of [political] party for a time departed, and gave place for a general burst of National Feeling.” (Cunningham, p.36)

Monroe was not an eloquent speaker, or even a memorable one, unlike his predecessors in the presidency. But he could speak on the fly, and often responded with off-the-cuff or rapidly prepared speeches several times a week or even several times a day during his tour. He also became the first president to venture west of the Appalachians, traveling as far west as Detroit—which fit perfectly with his idea that the west was the future of America. (Keep in mind that, back then, the Ohio and Tennessee river valleys were the American west, with the Louisiana territory being considered the American desert.) The president visited the northeast and the northwest in 1817, and went on a second tour through the south and mid-western states and even the Cherokee nation in 1819. He was urged to make a third trip to visit New Orleans and western territories like Missouri, but the trips were exhausting, and he never went again.

Still, no other president has equaled Monroe’s goodwill travels, nor been so repeatedly enthusiastically received everywhere he went. (A president coming to town in those days was a once in a lifetime event, so naturally they were grand affairs.)

Headaches with General Jackson and Florida
The goodwill sparked by Monroe’s travels lasted for some time—even throughout the era, for there were no wars, and the major domestic political issues of the day were settled rather quickly when compared to the usual snail pace of matters in Washington. But the “Era of Good Feelings” masked some of the tensions of the period, which saw the smallest hint of a flexing of America’s muscle, now that she seemed, at last, free from the possibility of foreign interference.

Gen. Andrew Jackson, however, seemed determined to impose his will on the new president, Monroe’s policies be damned. Jackson, victor of the battle of New Orleans, commanded the southern department. Monroe and his secretary of war, James Calhoun, ordered Jackson to deal with the aggressive Seminole Indians in Florida. Florida was not yet a state and still belonged to Spain, except for a western segment that would eventually form the gulf segments of Alabama and Mississippi.

Jackson, however, “interpreted” his orders to pacify the Seminole to include eliminating those agitating the Indians: the Spanish. Against orders, Jackson advanced on and captured two Spanish forts and Spanish-held Pensacola, and executed two men he claimed were British agents. While Jackson’s actions actually did pacify upper Florida, they created an unwelcome diplomatic situation for the president. Jackson had already proven troublesome by refusing an order from the War Department until Monroe straitened out that matter; now he threatened to bring war with Spain.

Monroe and his party definitely wanted to add Florida to the Union (a goal of Jefferson’s, actually), but he wanted to do it legally and without war with Spain. Subsequent congressional investigations produced nothing. In a fascinating letter exchange between the president and Jackson, Monroe soften his dismay and rendered the matter a misunderstanding; Jackson, however, was miffed that he was even questioned. Monroe eventually dropped the matter because Jackson’s actions exposed Spain’s weakness in Florida and led directly to the Adams-Onis treaty (see the Monroe Doctrine below). Jackson, by the way, emerged more popular than ever.

Historians differ over who was at “fault” here: an ambiguous Monroe or an over-zealous Jackson. I’m inclined to think the latter, based on the letters exchanged between the two men, Monroe’s coolness and Jackson’s reputation for being a hothead.

An expedition into the wilderness
Florida was not the only region to lay in Monroe’s expansionist plans. He also looked to the west and upper west, and with the enthusiastic support of secretary of war Calhoun, he commissioned a joint military-scientific expedition to the mouth of the Missouri in 1819-1820. The idea was to both place a military presence in the Yellowstone region and begin mapping and recording the vast Louisiana territory beyond what Louis & Clark had done nearly 15 years earlier.

You’ve probably never heard of the Long expedition because things went wrong from the start: supply problems, steamboat troubles, money woes, death, and other concerns dogged the expedition so that in never came off as planned. In the end, the scientific arm of the expedition wound up reaching the mouth of the Platte, then cut south then back east. Despite being something of a fiasco, it nevertheless brought back a plethora of scientific data, maps, reports and diaries—and even excited the nation for a brief while. It’s a small feather in Monroe’s cap that has seemingly been lost to history.

The Panic of 1819 and presidential style
Monroe had a hands-on approach to his presidency, as proven by his involvement in the Long expedition (but not to the extent that Jefferson was in planning Lewis & Clark’s journey) and also in the written record of his communications with his department heads. Although Monroe was not brilliant like Jefferson or Madison, or commanding like Washington, he was able to have his way as president by seeking his cabinet’s opinion—or that of Congress—and then making his decision. Never one to act hastily, Monroe would gage all sides of an argument, often hearing contradictory advice from Adams, Calhoun and Crawford (his principle cabinet) and then acting. Although the Jeffersonian tradition was that the executive did not place direct pressure on Congress, Monroe’s department heads actually had a hand in writing legislation—which, of course, means that Monroe had a hand in moving Congress, however indirectly.

Sometimes, though, because of his style, he missed some of the signs. While the “era of good feelings” churned along, it was about to come to a crashing halt with the very first panic, or economic depression, in United States history. (There had been depressions in colonial history but this is the first for the nation itself.) President Monroe was caught somewhat off guard by this, as he either misread the warning signs while on his second tour in 1819, or was not fully informed by his cabinet officers of the seriousness of the situation. A scandal in the Second Bank of the United States was dealt with and that seemed to mitigate matters, but the Panic nevertheless came on in later 1819. It lasted into the next year, and interestingly enough, Monroe took little action to combat it other than to economize and make sure that the government remained fiscally solvent. (Can you imagine a president doing that today?)

Military crunch
Partially in response to the Panic of 1819 and partially because of the belief that America’s freedom was secure, Congress ordered a military cutback. Secretary of War Calhoun proved quite adept at meeting Congress’ demands, expertly crafting a military structure that was heavy on officers. His idea was that in time of war, the army would have plenty of officers, with only the easily trained private ranks needing to be filled.

Meanwhile, Monroe, based on his brief tenure as Madison’s secretary of war and perhaps his own army experience, was quite keen to build up America’s coastal fortifications. These projects were well underway until Congress cut off funding. Congress was less stingy with money for the navy, recognizing the need to protect American shipping from pirates, for example. Several major ships of the line and frigates were laid down during Monroe’s term.

The Compromise of 1820
The Panic of 1819 didn’t fully shatter the illusion of the Era of Good Feelings; something more sinister did. The admission of Missouri to the Union was proceeding normally until two northern congressmen introduced amendments stating that slavery be prohibited from any new state west of the Mississippi River. The issue of slavery, which had lay beneath open national discussion seemingly as part of a “gentleman’s agreement,” if you will, soon became the talk of the nation. For months, Congress considered no other business except Missouri, and discussion became incredibly heated.

The issue literally threatened to rend the nation. Representatives of slave states argued that congress had no business telling a state whether it could or could not have slavery. Free state representatives argued that Congress could indeed decide the terms on which a state could enter the Union. Monroe, for his part, did not directly enter the debate—believing it not the executive’s place to do so—but worked through his son-in-law, George Hay, to publish “anonymous” letters expressing his opinion. And that opinion was that Congress could not impose restrictions on a state’s entry where none had been imposed on any other. Contrary to some opinions, Monroe actually did make his presence felt directly in the debate, particularly with his close, informal contact with members of Congress, especially the Virginia delegation.

The president committed to veto any bill that placed restrictions on Missouri’s admission, so when Congress finally voted on a compromise, Monroe embraced it publicly. Missouri would be admitted as a slave state, Maine as a free state, and no slavery would be permitted north of 36 degrees 30’ latitude.

Monroe, himself a slave owner and destroyer of a slave rebellion in 1800 in Virginia, was not happy with this sectional hostility, and blamed Federalists and extreme Democrat-Republicans.


Second term
But the Missouri Compromise actually had little effect on the presidential election that year. With the Federalists shrinking ever closer to oblivion, the dominant party, in absence of real opposition, naturally began to fracture. By the time Monroe sailed to an easy re-election in 1820 (there was no one who offered a serious challenge and he won an electoral landslide) the fractures were apparent.

Some members of Congress, including his House nemesis, Henry Clay, considered his presidency to have ended as soon as his second term started. The contraction of funds for the military, a sign of Monroe’s weakness during his second term, iwas tself a sign of the weakening cohesion of the Republican party founded by Jefferson and Madison. The fractioning of the Republicans left Monroe without a solid party base from which to draw strength; factions were forming around possible successors to Monroe. Even his own cabinet contained three possible strong contenders: Adams, Calhoun and Crawford at Treasury (his vice president, Daniel Tompkins, was a non-entity).

The question of succession often left Monroe isolated: He was at odds with Congress over military funding, Indian affairs and internal improvements. Monroe vetoed measures by Congress geared toward internal improvements, e.g. roads. He felt that such improvements were more the purview of the states instead of the federal government. He was also at odds with COngress over foreign policy. Congress thought Monroe’s policies were too timid—but Monroe had the experience to back up his policies, and he had John Quincy Adams on his side.

The “Monroe Doctrine”
Of all the actions that Monroe took during his eight years in office, none has had more lasting impact than the doctrine that bears his name. Few presidents, in fact, could make claim to having so enduring a legacy that is practical in nature.


The Monroe Doctrine was partially the brainchild of Monroe’s secretary of state, the accomplished Adams, but Monroe deservs the credit. It sprang from a complicated set of circumstances in Latin and South America and the Russian-controlled segment of North America. Many colonies rebelled against Spanish control, and Congress, led by Henry Clay, was itching to recognize them. Monroe wasn’t, but not because he didn’t sympathize. He just wanted to do it when he felt the time was right. Monroe wanted to make sure that Spain would ratify the Adams-Onis treaty ceding Florida to the United States and establishing the boundaries between the U.S. and Spanish possessions to the west.

Spain ratified the treaty in 1820, and the U.S. signed it in 1821. With the treaty signed, Congress stepped up pressure to recognize the colonies. Fearing that the mislabeled “Holy Alliance” of Spain and a few other European nations would send troops to suppress the revolutions, England proposed, through diplomatic channels, an alliance with America to stop this move.

After much consultation with his cabinet and his mentor friends, Monroe decided on a position. With Adams’ help, Monroe delivered what became known as the Monroe Doctrine in his December 1823 message to Congress. He stated that the United States would consider any interference in any American state by a European nation as a hostile act, and that the American continents were closed to colonization.

Congress and the public hailed the message; Europe, on the other hand, figuratively laughed—but no “Holy Alliance” armies came to reclaim the colonies, more because of England’s fleet than the declaration of the upstart American president.

The “Monroe Doctrine” was not actually labeled as such until two decades after Monroe’s death in 1831. While hailed in 1823 as a seminal event, it quickly faded over the excitement of the 1824 presidential election.

Indian policy
One last aspect of Monroe’s presidency deserves mention. In his final report to Congress (note: the same thing as the modern State of the Union address), Monroe proposed removing all Indian tribes to the west bank of the Mississippi. Previously, Monroe had advocated removal only if tribes agreed to exchanging land for land. Throughout his entire term, he resisted Georgia’s call to remove by force the Cherokees who refused to leave.

Monroe changed his mind about removal—but made no official policy and took no official action—because he thought that forced removal to western lands, and the introduction of schools and other “civilized” practices, would prevent their extermination. In a way, he was right. But it would be many decades before the United States adopted a policy toward making Indians actual citizens.

Exit Monroe
I won’t go into the details here of the election of 1824 or the “corrupt bargain” that elevated John Quincy Adams to the presidency (that’s for the next entry), except to say that, given how close Monroe was to two of the top four candidates (Adams and Crawford, with Calhoun destined to easily win the vice presidency), Monroe bowed out of any kind of participation.

His exit was graceful, and many a state legislature voted their thanks for his half-century of service to the nation. He left office in a dire financial condition, with Congress actually recompensing him more than $29,000 of a requested $53,000 for various services rendered, including two diplomatic missions and refurbishing the White House from his own funds. It would be many, many years before Congress would authorize a pension for presidents.

Final Assessment

James Monroe is one of the easiest presidents to write about. An unassuming, inoffensive man, Monroe was not a brilliant theorist like John Adams or James Madison. He wasn’t a charismatic, luminary like Washington, nor was he a dazzling speaker, writer and personality like Jefferson. What he was, however, was a hard working man who was fully aware of his limitations and worked well within those boundaries. Once he set his mind to a task, he accomplished it.

He wasn’t afraid to surround himself with brilliant men (Crawford, J. Q. Adams, Calhoun), seek the advice of his mentor friends (Jefferson and Madison) and reject their advice when he made his decisions. He had the courage of his convictions, and never appeared wishy-washy on anything.

He had a strong grasp of the Constitution, his executive powers and limits, and an equally strong grasp of foreign affairs. He was an excellent communicator in that he kept on top of letters, correspondence, orders, bills, etc. As a public speaker, though, he was unmemorable. Reading his speeches and letters is something of a chore, as they contain none of the soaring prose of Jefferson or insights of Adams (but run-on sentences that anticipate Faulkner.)

On the downside, Monroe was such a workaholic that he could often miss the forest for the trees. When on his tour in 1819, people were telling him that things were starting to go sour, but he was seemingly blindsided when the Panic hit. And the desire to bury the Federalists and fulfill Jefferson’s dream of “we are all Federalists; we are all Republicans” had the unintended effect of leaving him without a party to lead, as the party fractured by his second term—leaving him more isolated than engaged as the hunt was on for his successor.

One final note: The Monroe Doctrine has of course long since outlived its creator, and has been cited many times by presidents to justify actions almost to the present day. Critics have decried its use, saying it is justification for United States hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.

Final assessment: Monroe was mostly successful in his endeavors (though definitly not entirely), and popular throughout his two terms.

Resources


I must admit that I was wary about reading The American Presidents volume on James Monroe, because it’s written by uber-liberal and failed presidential wannabe Gary Hart. I’d heard that Hart used this book to attack George W. Bush. Well, that proved to be true, but it was a small portion of Hart's book. But that's not why I dislike it. The volume is easily the weakest in The American Presidents series, because Hart goes to great pains to remind the reader that Monroe created the Monroe Doctrine—like, repeatedly, and several times, and over and over. What in the world possessed series editor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. to commission Gary Hart to write this volume? If Hart wanted to write a book about just the Monroe Doctrine and the mind behind it, and make the case that Monroe was the first "national security president"—a notion I find intriging but somewhat forced—he succeed. But in the process of making his thesis he sidelines everything else in Monroe’s presidency.


Superior resources to Hart’s misplaced volume are Noble E. Cunningham’s The Presidency of James Monroe (1996) of the University of Kansas’ presidents series—this was my primary resource—and Harry Ammon’s James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (1990).




Illustrations

1. James Monroe painted by Gilbert Stuart, 1817, while on his first tour of the Union. (public domain image)

2. Washington Crossing the Delaware, painted by Emanuel Leutze. Original in the permanent collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. In this highly fanciful painting, James Monroe is depicted holding the flag right behind George Washington. (public domain image)

3. James Monroe painted by Samuel F.B. Morse. Official White House Collection (White House Historical Association)

4. Map of the Adams-Onis Treaty. See here for rights for the map.

5. Monroe lies in state in the House of Representatives, the same place where he was sworn into office in 1821. (Library of Congress image)

6. Monroe’s final resting place in Hollywood Cemetery in Richmond, Va. Originally he was buried with family in New York, but was moved here in 1858. (Library of Congress image)

Sunday, February 4, 2007

Number 2 : John Adams

(Written February 2007, updated January 2009)

Years in office: 1797-1801

Pre-service occupations: delegate to the first and second Continental Congresses, minister plenipotentiary, vice president

Key events during his administration: Quasi-war with France (1798-1800), Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), John Marshall appointed to the Supreme Court (1800)

Nicknames: The Duke of Braintree, the Colossus of Debate (bestowed by Jefferson), Old Sink or Swim

Presidential rating: Mildly successful, and somewhat unpopular

ESSAY

“Sit down, John!” are the first words that come to mind when I hear the name “John Adams.” The words aren’t spoken, either. They’re sung.

If you have seen the quirky musical, “1776,” you’ll recall a line-dancing Benjamin Franklin and the rest of the Continental Congress demanding that William Daniels’ outspoken Adams “sit down!” once more.

Fortunately, popular historian David McCullough has given us a less silly popular portrait of America’s second president for the modern era. (2008 note: HBO made an outstanding and Emmy-winning miniseries from McCullogh’s book, starring Paul Giamatti and Laura Linney, which fortunately now supplants William Daniels’ singing and dancing Adams.)

John Adams was a founding father, one of the key players of the Revolution and the formation of the country. He was a brilliant man—and had an even more brilliant wife, Abigail, who was his love, friend and sounding board. As Washington’s vice president, he, along with Hamilton, was a founder of the Federalists and an often bitter rival of Thomas Jefferson. His ideas still resonate today, though people—unfortunately, in some ways—tend to reach back more to Jefferson than to Adams. His family proved to be a dynasty: his cousin was fellow Patriot Samuel Adams, his son became the sixth president, his grandson played a key role in keeping England out of the Civil War, and his great-grandson, Henry Adams, became one of America’s most celebrated men of letters (The Education of Henry Adams).

He also bears the distinction of being the only one-term president and only non-Virginian amid the “Virginia dynasty” of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe—which was ended, fittingly enough, by his own son, also a one-term president.

A philosopher, but no monarchist

It’s difficult two write about Adams without including Jefferson and vice-versa, because the two men represented such polar opposites—but neither could convince the other of his sincerity. Adams’ biographer in The America Presidents series, John Patrick Diggins, describes the second president as being one of the three leading thinkers of the age:

“Hamilton was a mercantilist who believed in the fusion of state and economy, Jefferson an individualist who believed in the sovereignty of the people, Adams a constitutionalist who believed in the efficacy of government. Hamilton looked to the oligarchial few who would be motivated by responsibility, Jefferson to the democratic many who would guard freedom with jealousy, Adams to the single executive who would preserve liberty by relying on the government and its ‘machinery.’”

This vision in triplicate was difficult to reconcile, though somehow we’ve been managing to do so for more than 225 years. Of course, Hamilton and Adams found more common ground, though the two split after Adams became president because he felt Hamilton too closely tied to money while Hamilton believed himself to be the heir-apparent to Washington. Adams believed strongly in “the machinery of government” to keep people virtuous and was suspicious of Jefferson’s equally strong belief that common people (e.g., white, propertied men) could be virtuous if left “unmolested” by government. Adams believed strongly in the republican form of government, and was suspicious of the masses—of “democracy,” which he believed Jefferson was all for. Neither had a complete vision, however.

John Adams was the closest man to a philosopher we’ve ever had in the presidency. He was a political philosopher, the only man besides Woodrow Wilson to pen a political treatise before he became president (not counting Madison, who co-wrote The Federalist). In a couple of ponderous and dense works—probably never even read by his political enemies—Adams laid out his understanding of constitutional/republican government and defended America against European monarchy and later the French Revolution. He viewed the state as the arbiter of justice between conflicting factions and the preserver of human liberty. But Adam’s enemies, mainly his one-time friend Jefferson, used them and Adams’ actions as fodder that he was a closet monarchist seeking to set up an American version of royalty. Jefferson’s fears—many of them stated privately or whispered to hurt Adams publicly—of Adams’ supposed love of monarchy and European aristocracy wound up dinging Adams’ presidency badly. But Jefferson was chasing a phantom menace—a “reverse red scare,” as Diggins put it—that would nevertheless help destroy the Federalists as a party in 1800.

However, Adams was no monarchist. Instead, he thought that the central government should have some measure of decorum and strength. More to the point, Adams believed in a strong executive providing balance between democracy and aristocracy, between the “credulous many” and the “artful few,” writes Diggins. While the framers of the Constitution saw the legislative branch as the base of power uniting the scattered and disconnected country, Adams (in Europe during the constitutional debates) viewed the chief executive as fulfilling that role. The executive, he argued, could alone unite the fragmented country, but it was his focus on the executive that fueled his enemies’ fears/fantasies of monarchy. His own party didn’t help matters by propagating the idea of a governing elite, which smacked too much of the old ways for the radical Jefferson and his followers.

In addition, Adams was abhorred by the excesses of the French Revolution, of which Jefferson and his compatriots believed should have been treated as a companion piece to the American Revolution. Opposition to the French Revolution was no small thing, because for the Francophiles, it seemed to make no sense to be all for the spirit of ’76 but against the spirit of 1789 in France. To the Jeffersonians, if you opposed the French Revolution, you ultimately opposed the American Revolution. (Though to be fair to Jefferson, by 1800 he did back off from his whole-hearted embrace of France’s revolution.) This division played a role in the election of 1796 and all throughout Adam’s presidency and only furthered the division between the Republicans (the Jeffersonians) and the Federalists led by Adams and Hamilton, who would soon split themselves.

So that’s the set-up. With that in mind, what kind of president did Adams make? Has history treated this man kindly? There’s obviously much interest surrounding him, otherwise McCullough’s biography—which largely omitted Adams’ denser political theories in favor of narrative excitement—would have bombed faster than most movies about the Revolution.

Out from Washington’s long shadow

Unlike many seekers of the presidency today, John Adams didn’t look upon the executive position as the culmination of his life’s ambition. Instead, he viewed it as one part of the journey. (The climax had been the Revolution, and nothing would ever top that.)

Under the now-anachronistic election rules, the election of 1796 made Adams president and Jefferson vice president. Talk about having a snake in the house. (Imagine if Bill Clinton’s vice president had been Newt Gingrich, or Ronald Reagan’s had been Ted Kennedy.) But while Adams couldn’t control who his vice president was, he could control his cabinet. The Massachusetts thinker kept Washington’s cabinet members at state, war and the treasury—three men who really weren’t all that good at their jobs, but they were the replacements for the final years of Washington’s second term. Adams retained them supposedly to help establish some continuity in civil service, but they proved to be a burden to him—and he really only used them as sounding boards anyway. And there is some belief that his cabinet, while not quite treasonous, was working against him. It seems that while Adams was quite prescient it talking about government, he was sometimes rather poor at recognizing when he was the object of opposition.

Adams as president liked to keep his own counsel, in holding with his idea of the strong executive, but this often worked to his detriment as it created an air of indecisiveness—quite different from Washington. He didn’t help himself when he often retreated to his home in Quincy, Mass.

While Washington’s presidency was, for all intents and purposes the “honeymoon” period for America, Adams’ was the one where things truly got nasty. And unfortunately for him, almost every major action in his entire term in office had something to do with France.

Francophiles versus Anglophiles

Presidents are supposed to get a honeymoon period, according to modern politics, but Adams got socked in the face right from the start. France, embroiled in its own revolution, was none too happy with Washington’s Jay Treaty, which France’s Directorate viewed as an alliance with England, though it was nothing of the sort. The French had begun preying on American shipping in 1796, before Washington left office. French ships were hitting American shipping, taking crews, ships and cargo bound for England ostensibly as “payment” for services rendered during the Revolution. Then, they refused to receive America’s diplomats.

On his inauguration night, Adams wanted a bipartisan commission to go to France—meaning, both Federalists and Republicans (Jeffersonians)—but Jefferson declined and he assured Adams that Madison would too. This marked the final rift between Adams and Jefferson.

Events exploded with France in 1798 when President Adams revealed the infamous “XYZ Affair.” France’s Talleyrand and his agents demanded large bribes from America’s ministers; in return, they’d be happy to restore normal relations with the United States. When Adams made the attempted bribery public, outrage grew and his popularity reached its zenith. War was called for—even as the Republicans were vehemently opposed because they saw such a war playing right into British hands. Adams called for the establishment of a standing U.S. Navy and a standing U.S. Army—both of which Jefferson despised, because of course, to him, they smacked of monarchy and elitist control. But Congress, controlled by the Federalists, agreed, and established both. New ships were laid down and an army of 10,000 men was inaugurated. (The army was ostensibly created to fight the French, and although it was never used for this purpose, it outlasted the stated reason for its creation.)

The “Quasi-War” with France was never declared, but it lasted two years, from 1798-1800. The U.S. Navy captured 85 French ships and privateers. The United States was technically fighting alongside England, but neither navy cooperated in any significant way. In the end, Napoleon, now ruler of France, agreed to a settlement because the conflict with America was doing him no good. But the undeclared war sharpened the divisions between the two dominant factions in America.

Truly bad law?

But perhaps the one thing that did Adams in as president was the Alien and Sedition Acts. Adams had less to do with them than the Federalist congress, but they did bear his signature. And there is some evidence that Abigail was one of the drivers behind them. Regardless, they are forever associated with John Adams. There were four laws:

  1. The Naturalization Act extended the duration of residence required for aliens to become citizens, from five years to 14, repealed in 1802.

  2. The Alien Friends Act authorized the president to deport any resident alien considered “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,” expired in 1800.

  3. The Alien Enemies Act authorized the president to apprehend and deport resident aliens if their home countries were at war with the United States. Enacted July 6, 1798. This act remains in effect today as 50 USC Sections 21-24.

  4. The Sedition Act made it a crime to publish “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” against the government or its officials; expired March 3, 1801.

The Sedition Act was the one that caused the most consternation, and with good reason. Biographer Diggins writes that:

“In American history, almost every important presidency has had its one moment of deep regret, an action taken that might have been avoided, one that backfired and played into the hands of the opposition.”

This was Adams’ moment, for it definitely played into Jefferson’s and his allies’ hands, and it likely lead directly to the end of the Federalists as a party and the end of Adams’ political career. Most certainly it was an assault on free speech, an attempt to silence criticism of the government, as Republicans rightfully charged. (Jefferson, as an aside, greatly overreached in his rebuttal, using his stealth support to create resolutions to nullify the laws in Kentucky and Virginia, and failing that, leaving the union. There was little support outside of those states, but it is fair to say that Jefferson is the originator of nullification and secession, which would bedevil the United States 60 years later!)

Some Jefferson fans have gone so far to paint this as a mini “reign of terror,” which is a ludicrous stretch. Because while the acts were rarely enforced—some Francophiles did flee the country—and Adams never signed a deportation order, the damage was done, and Adams’ reputation suffered, along with his party.

Adams relations with his own party were not good, either. Adams had reluctantly agreed to Hamilton as commander of the new army. But in a sign of bipartisan support, he sought Democrat-Republican Aaron Burr as second-in-command, but short-sighted Federalists refused—which deepened the already terrible suspicions of the Jeffersonians and would help to seal the fate of the Federalists.

Courageous acts

When the Federalist-controlled Congress passed a tax on property (the first-ever) to help support the Quasi-War, there was a mini-rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Federal property surveyors were harassed, and in response, several men were arrested. A man by the name of Fries organized a small mob to free the men. Having done so, they disbursed.

This was nothing more than a tax revolt—as American as apple pie and hot fudge sundaes, Diggins writes—but outraged super-Federalists acted as if it were treason against the government. The Federalists greatly over-reacted; Fries and 60 others were brought to Philadelphia to be tried on treason or other charges, and Fries himself was sentenced to be hanged. But Adams shocked his party by pardoning Fries, saying that he and his cohorts had engaged in a rebellion, not an insurrection against the government. Despite the pardon, the whole sorry affair turned stalwart Federalist western Pennsylvania solidly against Adams and his party.

Adams’ pardon was a courageous act—going against his entire cabinet and party—and it cost him their support.

The final nail in the political coffin for the Federalists as far as Adams was concerned was how he ended the Qausi-War: by assigning a diplomat to France to re-open relations with that country, now that the Directorate was gone (replaced by Napoleon) and ending the whole affair. (McCullough calls this Adams’ most courageous act as president.) Federalists wanted war! with France, not peace. But Adams, never one to believe in war for war’s sake, wanted the matter ended. And so it was.

So, by the end of his presidency, Adams was something of a man alone. He was distrusted by his own party—mainly because he wasn’t “pure” enough—but he nevertheless still managed to narrowly lose to Jefferson in a several-man race for the electoral vote.

A brilliant jurist

In one of his last acts as president, John Adams appointed John Marshall to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He would prove to be one of the greatest jurists to ever serve the country. It was a smart choice, and one not made blindly. A Federalist ally—and Adams’ last secretary of state—Marshall was the longest-serving chief justice who also established the principle of judicial review and fashioned the judiciary as independent of the executive and legislative branches. He was a foe of Jeffersonianism throughout his tenure, which lasted until 1835.

The charge persists, especially among Jefferson fans, that Adams made a slew of “midnight,” or last-minute, appointments to bedevil Jefferson after Adams left office. Whether true or not, it’s hard to dispute the power of the Marshall appointment.

Final Assessment

I’ve often heard that Woodrow Wilson was the smartest man who has ever been president. I’m not so sure. It might have been Adams. Jefferson was brilliant and learned in many ways, but I don’t quite think he was as smart as he thinks he was.

Adams came to the presidency less qualified—in the modern understanding—for the office than any other man, yet he was more prepared for the office than any other, because he understood the office better than any of them and also believed wholeheartedly in the necessary power of the office. Yet understanding the presidency from a politically philosophical point of view did not necessarily translate into his being able to wield it as well as he needed to. He proved less deft at the political game than Jefferson (or perhaps less devious).

In his call for a strong executive, Adams anticipated the “imperial presidency” of modern America. His actions also ensured that when America finally fought a second war with England, we actually had an army and navy. If Jefferson and the Republicans had had their way, the War of 1812 could have been much more of a disaster—and possibly even the end of America. Is it a stretch to say that? Perhaps.

But Adams looked ahead—far ahead. His mind was often not on the immediate, but on the future. He wanted to make sure what he built endured, so he was often the victim of men like Jefferson and Madison—and even Hamilton. (But Abigail was watchful.) Adams would demand proof of his political enemies’ charges, instead of counter-attacking; but politics doesn’t wait for proof to emerge, because lies can take hold far faster than truth, especially when truth is not vigorously defended.

In the final assessment, Adams the president deserves a place almost equal to Adams the founding father. His political theories, which he put into practice as president, helped assure that the United States would be a democratic-republic, and not just the “for the people” democracy that the Jeffersonians thought that they wanted. And Jefferson unwittingly owed the success of his presidency to the very political philosophy that he repeatedly attacked in Adams!

Adams lost in the tough and disputed election of 1800, and his defeat can be seen as a rebuke of his policies—mainly the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Fries affair and the simple fact that he was unable to defend himself against scurrilous charges of monarchy. But his legacy endured with republicanism (small “r”), the Marshall appointment, a more permanent army (though Jefferson would meddle with that) and beefed up navy, and refusing to bow to other nations just because they were allies. Jefferson and his allies succeeded in undoing much of Federalism, but they couldn’t touch Adams’ true successes; therefore, Adams should rate as a mildly successful president—albeit one who was not popular.

One final note: Adams’ presidential reputation has been enjoying something of a renaissance, thanks to McCullough, an earlier work by Joseph Ellis, and Diggins’ biography, all of which challenge the conventional academic wisdom of President Adams and his era. After all, the election of 1800 was not quite the “second American Revolution” as Jefferson hailed it as being, but rather a different type of glorious event: the affirmation that the American experiment could and would succeed. Power had been peacefully transferred between two antagonistic parties without a shot being fired.

That, ultimately, is President John Adams’ legacy.

Final assessment: Mildly successful and somewhat unpopular.

Resources

Two recent books are definitely worth your time. To understand Adams’ political theories, read John Patrick Diggins, John Adams, (2003) part of the American Presidents series. To get the full flavor of the man, read David McCullough’s superb John Adams (2001). You could also get an excellent illustration through the HBO miniseries of the same name.

Illustration

The picture is from the official White House portrait.